The United States Of America

The Constitution And Democracy

Changing Role of the Speaker 
During the speakerships of Thomas B. Reed (1889-1891, 1895-1899) and Joseph G. Cannon (1903-1911), House leaders appointed committees, sometimes ignored seniority in designating chairmen, and set the agenda for debate to suit their policies. First Reed and then Cannon commanded the REPUBLICAN PARTY <rparty.html> and, therefore, the House. In the first decade of the 20th century "insurgent" Republicans, led by George Norris of Nebraska, rebelled against Cannon and joined the DEMOCRATS to remove the speaker from the Rules Committee, strip him of his power to appoint committees, and adopt other reforms that made the speaker less powerful and more responsive to a majority of the House--not necessarily a partisan majority. Since then speakers have relied more on informal influence than on formal authority. They have preferred to work privately, hence flexibly, rather than to consolidate power publicly and thus restrict their latitude for compromise. Sam Rayburn, whose 17 years as speaker (1940-1947, 1949-1953, 1955-1961) far exceeded any previous tenure in that office, epitomized the informal leader.
Senate Leadership 
Senate leaders too have relied almost exclusively on informal influence. Indeed, the formal leadership positions, such as those of majority and minority leader, have occasionally been filled by relatively junior senators selected through a compromise among senior party figures. Not until Lyndon B. JOHNSON </presidents/ea/bios/36pjohn.html> became Democratic leader in 1953 and majority leader in 1955 did a formal party leader centralize power in the Senate. Although chosen by a traditional compromise and while serving only his first Senate term, Johnson soon defined his role in quite untraditional ways. He acquired the largest staff any leader ever had by drawing together assistants from his several other positions as chairman of committees and subcommittees. Johnson made himself the center of Senate activity, sometimes talking with every Democratic senator every day. Within a few years he became the acknowledged authority on what was acceptable to the Senate. He proved himself a consummate parliamentarian without precedent in Congress or in any other legislature. Nevertheless, when Johnson resigned in 1961 to serve as vice president, he had not yet so consolidated his authority and institutionalized his role that his successor would automatically inherit the accouterments of power. Senate leadership soon reverted to its customary decentralized style.
The Committee System 
The fate of most proposed legislation rests in the hands of the congressional committees. In 1913 the two houses had 135 committees. Some reduction occurred in the 1920s, but by the end of World War II, 81 committees still existed. The committee system was streamlined by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946.
In the 102d Congress the House had 22 standing committees: Agriculture; Appropriations; Armed Services; Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs; Budget; District of Columbia; Education and Labor; Energy and Commerce; Foreign Affairs; Government Operations; House Administration; Interior and Insular Affairs; Judiciary; Merchant Marine and Fisheries; Post Office and Civil Service; Public Works and Transportation; Rules; Science, Space, and Technology; Small Business; Standards of Official Conduct; Veterans' Affairs; and Ways and Means. The Senate had 16: Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, Appropriations; Armed Services; Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs; Budget; Commerce, Science, and Transportation; Energy and Natural Resources; Environment and Public Works; Finance; Foreign Relations; Governmental Affairs; Judiciary; Labor and Human Resources; Rules and Administration; Small Business; and Veterans' Affairs.
Most House members serve on only one committee; all Senators serve on several. Each may sit on one or more subcommittees. When bills are introduced in either house, they are referred to a committee. Experience and precedents have been codified to make reference virtually automatic, thus reducing the discretion and influence of the leaders; in rare cases of uncertainty the presiding officer, advised by the parliamentarian, designates the committee having jurisdiction.
The majority party holds a majority of the seats on every committee. The distribution of committee seats is usually adjusted when the ratio of majority to minority changes.
The Committee's Work 
The chairman of the committee (the majority party member whose continuous service is longest) to which the bill is referred decides whether to refer the bill to a subcommittee, hold hearings in the full committee, or ignore the bill. Some committees have adopted rules to govern the chairman, but in most he proceeds with considerable latitude. Certain sections of the nation, in which one party consistently defeats the other, return the same members of Congress for many years; hence, Southern Democrats and Midwestern Republicans, representing areas that, in the past, have undergone the least social change and that, consequently, have remained relatively conservative, have captured a high proportion of committee chairmanships. Chairmen appoint subcommittees, and subcommittee assignments depend less on seniority considerations and more on the chairman's preferences than do committee appointments. A sympathetic chairman can hasten a bill's passage by scheduling hearings or by affecting the composition of a subcommittee; an unsympathetic chairman can delay action, while his colleagues are reluctant to force his hand.
By custom, chairmen are respected for their positions--acquired through seniority, not through election by the House or party nor by appointment by the party leaders--and members will not readily impinge upon their power even when they differ with them on issues. Leaders can entreat but not command action on bills in committees or subcommittees. Once scheduled, hearings may last from hours to weeks, months, even years, depending on the amount of controversy. After hearing witnesses, public and private, committees or subcommittees vote to report the bill, with or without amendments. Subcommittees respect each others' recommendations: members of full committees hesitate to reverse actions of subcommittees of which they are not members, lest decisions of their own subcommittees in turn suffer reversal.
If the committee's decision is negative, a bill is virtually dead for that Congress. Representatives are disinclined to sign a discharge petition whereby a House majority may take a bill from a committee, lest they encourage similar actions against their own committee, and senators likewise are reluctant to remove a bill from a committee's jurisdiction.
Acting on Bills Approved by a Committee 
If the committee vote is affirmative, the bill is reported to the House or Senate and is placed on one of the calendars. Because the Senate is small, its calendar is simpler than the House's. In the Senate bills are taken from the calendar of business by unanimous consent on recommendation of the majority leader after consultation with his fellow party leaders and with the minority leader. Only rarely is a vote needed to remove a bill from the calendar and to make it pending Senate business. In the House bills are referred to the private calendar, consent calendar, union calendar (revenue and appropriation measures), or House calendar. For the House, taking action on a controversial bill is itself controversial. Because of the large number of House members desiring to participate in debate, leaders are reluctant to debate in the full House bills that are not likely to pass. Occasionally, for reasons of partisan advantage or as a favor to a member or a president who wants an issue for an election campaign, leaders will bring to a vote a bill that they expect to be defeated. Hence, voting to debate a bill is itself a key decision in the House, and opponents try to finish their work by preventing consideration.
Controversial bills come to the floor of the House on recommendation of the Committee on Rules (consisting, since 1961, of 10 majority and 5 minority members). Neither approval nor prompt decision is automatic at this point. Since Speaker Cannon's dominance of House procedure was broken in 1910 by enlarging the Rules Committee from 5 to 10 and by removing the Speaker from the committee, the committee has sometimes been closely attuned to the majority party's leadership and sometimes more representative of House bipartisan majorities. On highly controversial and innovative bills, Rules occasionally delays decision until it is too late in the session for both the House and Senate to complete action. When the Rules Committee recommends debate on the floor, the House votes on Rules' proposal in the form of a simple House resolution. Then, on adoption, it resolves itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.
Under open rules, amendments are in order in the Committee of the Whole but, if added, must be affirmed again after the committee rises and reports to the House. If defeated, they cannot be offered again. On tax and occasional other complicated bills, the Rules Committee recommends (and the House almost invariably adopts) a closed rule that limits or prohibits amendments. When the House passes a bill, the measure is referred to the Senate (unless, of course, the Senate has already passed it), where similar procedures are followed.
Delay in the Senate has one additional possibility: the filibuster. Unlike the House, the Senate does not limit debate by majority vote. Unanimous consent or a two-thirds majority of those present and voting are required to close Senate debate. A lone senator or a coalition of senators can postpone a vote, perhaps long enough to compel compromise if not defeat.
If the Senate passes a bill in the precise form of the House measure, it is delivered to the president for signature. If both houses do not pass the same version of a bill, one house must agree to the other's; otherwise, the bill is referred to a conference committee of members of both House and Senate whose jurisdiction extends only to resolving differences between the two houses. Compromises adopted by conference committee must be approved by both houses before the bill is sent to the president. At each of these many stages, a bill must win in order to become law. Defeat at any point, except by a presidential veto that is overridden by a two-thirds vote of each house, is permanent, at least until another Congress convenes. Moreover, if a Congress adjourns before a bill has passed through all stages, the bill dies and must begin the enactment process anew in the next Congress. Hence, the iron law of parliaments: it is easier to defeat a motion than to pass it.
Congress and the Executive Branch 
The decisions of the Constitutional Convention to establish a bicameral Congress and to separate it from the executive illustrate a major theme of 18th century American political thought. The Founding Fathers emphasized checks and balances as means of assuring individual freedom and avoiding governmental tyranny. Similar principles had been stressed by classical political philosophers, including Solon, Plato, and Aristotle, in whom the Founding Fathers were well read, and also by contemporary theorists, among them Blackstone, Hume, and Voltaire, who were impressed by Newtonian analogies to the physical and natural order of the universe. Montesquieu thought he observed a nicely honed balance among English political institutions, especially in the separation of powers among legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Although Montesquieu's description was found inaccurate for the British system, his De l'esprit des lois (The Spirit of the Laws) nevertheless served the Founding Fathers as a model in writing the Constitution of their new nation.
The separation of legislative from judicial and executive functions led not merely to investing Congress with all legislative power; it also charged each house of Congress with checking and balancing the other. Many theorists feared, not political power per se, but power unchecked by countervailing power. Indeed, many contemporaries regarded the Articles of Confederation as a failure because the government they created had insufficient power. The framers of the Constitution, therefore, intended to create a viable government, one vested with sufficient power to fulfill the responsibilities assigned to it. Increasing governmental power required new checks and balances on each source of power. As the federal government was to be balanced by the governments of the states and each house of Congress by its fellow, so each branch of the federal government was to be balanced by the others.
Separation of Powers, in Practice 
Strict separation of legislative, judicial, and executive functions, however, cannot in fact be drawn or maintained. Although Congress is the principal legislative branch, the judiciary interprets the meaning of acts of Congress and has assumed power to review their constitutionality. The Constitution obliges the president to report to Congress annually on the "State of the Union" and thereby to recommend legislation. His signature is required for a bill to become law, unless each house of Congress passes the bill by a two-thirds majority after the president has withheld his signature. The Constitution empowers the Senate to participate in executive actions by confirming presidential appointments (including appointments to the federal courts) and by consenting to treaties through a two-thirds majority.
Thus, from the beginning of the new government, each branch involved itself in performing functions of another. Accordingly, each branch soon became expected not only to check and balance the others but also to create new practices and institutions for fulfilling the high aspirations of the Founding Fathers. Chief Justice John Marshall established the Supreme Court's acquisition of the power of judicial review (Marbury v. Madison); President Thomas JEFFERSON </presidents/ea/bios/03pjeff.html> extended the executive's power in ill-defined situations (for example, the Louisiana Purchase); and Speaker Henry Clay and other congressional leaders competed with the other branches to design programs and policies affecting national expansion, roads, tariffs, and slavery. Congress soon was expected (by itself and others) to be a full and active participant in the widest range of problems that concern national government.

Next >> | << Previous